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Abstract. This article presents a philosophical psychology case against subjecting former national leaders 
who allegedly committed atrocities committed while they were in power to adjudication through a 
criminal or civil justice system. 
 
The two strongest arguments for subjecting former national leaders to adjudication through a criminal 
or civil justice system for alleged atrocities are founded on deterrence and accountability. 
 
Deterrence suggests that adjudication will decrease the probability and/or severity of further atrocities 
by other leaders. However, this suggestion is problematic. For example, punishment as a possible, likely, 
or definite consequence of adjudication often has very unpredictable effects on observers and others 
who learn of the punishment. Moreover, the application of punishment as a deterrent for proscribed 
behavior suggests that potential perpetrators of atrocities engage in the latter through a rational and 
logical calculus uncontaminated or underwhelmed by the irrational, illogical, and unconscious. 
 
Accountability suggests that individuals must experience the just deserts of their actions--i.e., must reap 
what they sow. This suggestion also is problematic. Even if an appropriate combination of substantive, 
procedural, and distributive justice can be developed, one must consider that the individual who 
committed atrocities may not be the person who has undergone adjudication. The individual undergoing 
adjudication may have little memory or inaccurate memories for the specific atrocities. The individual 
may feel little sense of identification with the person who committed the atrocities. In fact, from a 
psychological viewpoint, the individual in the present may by no means be the individual of the past and 
may have led a life since the period of atrocities that may be apperceived as a metamorphosis. Is holding 
the individual of the present accountable ever or always the same as holding accountable the individual 
of the past? Can we not have two different individuals--if not many different individuals--over a life 
span? 
 
In the Pinochet case, problems with deterrence and accountability rationales for adjudication seem 
much more significant than contemporary legalistic and political concerns. These latter concerns--e.g., 
the appropriate jurisdiction of national judiciaries in international venues, the possibility of employing 
legal procedures, and violating legal intent to seek political advantage--beg questions bearing on the 
very subversion of the rule of law through the rule of law. Perhaps stalking the perpetrators of atrocities 
throughout political history is the ultimate projection--projecting the monster in each of us. (See Alford, 
C.F. (1997). The political psychology of evil. Political Psychology, 18, 1-17; Benjamin, R.D. (1998). 
Negotiation and evil: The source of religious and moral resistance to the settlement of conflicts. 
Mediation Quarterly, 15, 245-266; Ezzy, D. (1998). Theorizing narrative identity: Symbolic interactionism 
and hermeneutics. Sociological Quarterly, 39, 239-252; Hoge, W. (November 26, 1998). British court 
rules against Pinochet: Government must decide on extradition. The New York Times, 
http://www.nytimes.com; Klose, D.A. (1995). M. Scott peck's analysis of human evil: A critical review. 
Journal of Humanistic Psychology, 35, 37-66; Schiffrin, D. (1996). Narrative as self-portrait: 
Sociolinguistic constructions of identity. Language in Society, 25, 167-203.) (Keywords: Crime, Evil, 
Justice.) 
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